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1 Introduction
In this study, I examine the coordination of emission policy in a union of
countries. The production of goods in any country incurs emissions that
are spread all over the union, but efficiency in production can be improved
by research and development (R&D). The outcome of R&D is random and
follows a Poisson process. Welfare in any country depends positively on the
level of consumption and negatively on total emissions in the union. The
central planner of the union controls emissions by union-wide taxes. The
purpose for study is to find out the Pareto-optimal emission taxes for the
countries.
The impact of any environmental policy depends crucially on the exis-
tence of uncertainty. The papers [4], [8], [10] and [11] consider public pol-
icy by a growth model where productivity shocks follows a Wiener process.
Soretz [9] applies that approach to environmental policy. In contrast, I as-
sume that uncertainty is directly embodied in technological change in the
form of Poisson processes.
Beltratti et al. [3] introduce a growth model where an environmental asset
is a source of utility and depleted by a pollution process which is linked to
consumption. They define the concept of the Green Golden rule as the best
sustainable configuration, i.e. the path that gives the highest maintainable
level of instantaneous utility. Ayong Le Kama [2] transforms this model by
linking the pollution process to production. Following these papers, I search
for the Green Golden for the economic union.
I assume that in each country there is a local planner that maximizes
welfare and has enough instrument to control the allocation of resources
in the country. The local planners of all countries realize that decisions
in one country affect welfare in the other countries through emissions and
pollution. Following Dixit [5], I assume that each local planner estimates
the response of the others and makes its decisions by this information. To
construct a Pareto optimal policy for the union, I introduce a central planner
that maximizes welfare in the union through influencing the local planners’
decisions by emission taxes.
This paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 present the general
structure of the union and a single country. Sections 4 examine a local plan-
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ner’s and section 5 the central planner’s behavior. The optimization problems
are solved by dynamic programming with Poisson jump processes (techno-
logical change) and an ordinary differential equation (the accumulation of
pollution) as constraints.
2 The union
I consider a union of fixed number n of similar countries. In country j ∈
{1, ..., n}, there is a fixed labor supply L, of which the amount lj is used in
production and the rest zj in R&D:
L = lj + zj. (1)
Emissions mj are in fixed proportion to labor input in production, lj, in each
country. By a proper choice of the unit of labor, local emissions mj and total
emissions in the whole union, m, are then given by
mj = lj, m
.
=
n∑
j=1
mj =
n∑
j=1
lj. (2)
Each country j ∈ {1, ..., n} produces a different good. In the union, com-
petitive firms produce a consumption good from all these goods according
to
n∑
j=1
cj = y =
n∏
j=1
y
1/n
j , (3)
where cj is consumption in country j, yj output in country j, and y to-
tal consumption in the union. With some complication, the same results
can be generalized for any neoclassical production function with constant
returns to scale. Let pj be the price for good j. With Cobb-Douglas tech-
nology (3), the consumption price p is obtained by minimizing the unit cost
1
y
∑n
j=1 pjyj =
∑n
j=1 pj
yj
y
of the consumption good by the input-output ratios
(y1/y, ..., yn/y):
p = min
y1/y,...,yn/y
{ n∑
j=1
pj
yj
y
∣∣∣∣ n∏
j=1
(yj
y
)1/n
= 1
}
=
n∏
j=1
p
1/n
j .
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Because in the model there is no money that would pin down the nominal
price level at any time, the consumption price p can be normalized at unity:
1 = p =
n∏
j=1
p
1/n
j . (4)
Let t be time and P be the level of pollution in the union. Following [7], I
assume that total emissions m contribute the degree of pollution, P , but the
nature absorbs pollution at a constant rate h:
P˙
.
= dP/dt = m− hP. (5)
3 The countries
Assume that all planners share the same preferences and that total emissions
and the degree of pollution in the union decrease welfare in all countries. In
country j, the utility from an infinite stream of its consumption cj, emissions
m and pollution P beginning at time T is then given by
E
∫ ∞
T
u(cj,m, P )e
−ρ(t−T )dt,
∂u
∂cj
> 0,
∂u
∂m
< 0,
∂u
∂P
< 0, (6)
where E is the expectation operator, ρ > 0 the constant rate of time pref-
erence and u the level of instantaneous utility. Because it is impossible to
find any analytical solution for the general case (6) in Bellman’s dynamic
programming, I specify the instantaneous utility function in the exponential
form
u(cj,m, P )
.
= cσjm
−δP−ν , 0 < σ < 1, δ > 0, ν ≥ 0, (7)
where σ, δ and ν are constants. The constant 1− σ ∈ (0, 1) is the constant
rate of risk aversion. Following [2] and [3], I make the following definition:
Definition The Green Golden Rule (GGR) is the pattern of development
that gives the highest maintainable level of instantaneous utility (7) for all
countries j ∈ {1, ..., n}.
The efficiency of labor lj in production in country j is A
γj , where A > 1
is a constant and γj is the serial number of technology. In the advent of
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technological change in country j, this efficiency increases from Aγj to Aγj+1.
Total output in country j is given by
yj = A
γj lj. (8)
In production, firms employ labor lj up to the point where the wage wj is
equal to the output price pj times the marginal product of labor, ∂yj/∂lj:
wj = pj∂yj/∂lj = pjA
γj . (9)
The improvement of technology in country j depends on the labor zj
devoted to R&D. I assume that in a small period of time dt, the probability
that R&D leads to development of a new technology is given by λzjdt, while
the probability that R&D remains without success is given by 1− λzjdt,
where λ is the productivity of labor in R&D. This defines a Poisson process
q with
dqj =
{
1 with probability λzjdt,
0 with probability 1− λzjdt, (10)
where dqj is the increment of the process qj.
I assume that the central planner imposes a uniform tax τ on the product
wjmj of wages wj and emissions mj, and pays a uniform subsidy b to labor
income wjL throughout all countries j in the union. Thus, given (2), (8) and
(9), consumption in country j is determined by
cj = pjyj − τwjmj + bwjL = pjAγj [(1− τ)lj + bL], (11)
where pjyj is income from production, τwjmj emission taxes and bwjL sub-
sidies for labor. Noting (2), the central planner’s budget constraint is then
b
n∑
j=1
wjL = τ
n∑
j=1
wjmj = τ
n∑
j=1
wjlj, (12)
where b
∑n
j=1wjL is subsidies and τ
∑n
j=1wjmj emission taxes in the union.
In line with [5], I assume on the planners’ strategic behavior the following:
Assumption Planner j ∈ {1, ..., n} forms expectations on the prospective
responses of the other local planners ` 6= j to its action. It anticipates the
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others ` 6= j to increase their emissions m` by the constant β ∈ (−∞, 1)
units after it itself has increased its emissions mj by one unit.
This assumption and (2) imply dl`/dlj = dm`/dmj = β for all ` 6= j and
m = M(lj, n, β) with
∂M
∂lj
= 1 +
∑
` 6=j
dl`
dlj
= 1 + (n− 1)β. (13)
Here, M(lj, n, β) is planner j’s perceived supply function of total emissions
in the union. Because in the model all local planners j = 1, ..., n are in
symmetric position, they have the same perceived supply function (13). A
local planner takes β as a constant, but at the level of the whole union the
parameter β adjusts to keep the perceived supply of emissions, M(lj, n, β),
equal to actual emissions m for all planners j ∈ {1, ..., n}.
4 The local planners
Noting (13) and (5), local planner j’s perceived pollution evolves according
to
P˙ = M(lj, n, β)− hP, ∂P˙ /∂lj = ∂M/∂lj = 1 + (n− 1)β. (14)
Local planner j maximizes the utility of country j, (6) with (7), by consump-
tion cj and labor input (lj, zj) subject to the resource constraint (1), Poisson
technological change (10), the budget constraint (11), expectations (13) and
pollution (14), on the assumption that the price pj, the tax τ , the subsidy b
and the parameter β are kept constant. The value of the optimal program
for planner j starting at time T is then given by
Γj(γj, P, τ, b, pj, β, n, T )
.
= max
(cj , lj , zj) s.t. (1),(10),(11),(13),(14)
E
∫ ∞
T
cσj
mδ
P−νe−ρ(t−T )dt
= max
(lj , zj) s.t. (1),(10),(14)
E
∫ ∞
T
pσj
P ν
Aσγj
[(1− τ)lj + bL]σ
M(lj, n, β)δ
e−ρ(t−T )dt. (15)
I denote Γj = Γj(γj, P, τ, b, pj, β, n, T ) and Γ˜
j = Γj(γj+1, P, τ, b, pj, β, n, T ).
The Bellman equation corresponding to the optimal program (15) is given
by
ρΓj = max
lj
Ψj(lj, γj, P, τ, b, pj, β, n, T ), (16)
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where
Ψj(lj, γj, P, τ, b, pj, β, n, T ) =
pσj
P ν
Aσγj
[(1− τ)lj + bL]σ
M(lj, n, β)δ
+
∂Γj
∂P
P˙
+ λ(L− lj)
[
Γ˜j − Γj]. (17)
This, (13) and (14) lead to the first-order condition
∂Ψj
∂lj
=
[
(1− τ)σ
(1− τ)lj + bL −
δ
M
∂M
∂lj
]
pσj
P ν
Aσγj
[(1− τ)lj + bL]σ
M(lj, n, β)δ
+
∂Γj
∂P
∂P˙
∂lj
− λ[Γ˜j − Γj]
=
{
(1− τ)σ
(1− τ)lj + bL −
δ
m
[1 + (n− 1)β]
}
pσj
P ν
Aσγj
[(1− τ)lj + bL]σ
M(lj, n, β)δ
+
∂Γj
∂P
[1 + (n− 1)β]− λ[Γ˜j − Γj] = 0. (18)
To solve the dynamic program, I try the solution that the value of the
program, Γj, is in fixed proportion ϑj > 0 to instantaneous utility (7):
Γj(γj, P, τ, b, pj, β, n, T ) = ϑjp
σ
jA
σγj [(1− τ)lj + bL]σm−δP−ν . (19)
This implies
Γ˜j/Γj = Aσ, ∂Γj/∂P = −νΓj/P. (20)
Inserting (19) and (20) into the Bellman equation (16) and (17) yields
1/ϑj = ρ+ (1− Aσ)λ(L− lj) + νP˙ /P > 0. (21)
Inserting (19), (20) and (21) into the first-order condition (18) yields
(Aσ − 1)λ+ ν
P
[1 + (n− 1)β] =
{
(1− τ)σ
(1− τ)lj + bL +
δ
m
[1 + (n− 1)β]
}
1
ϑj
={
(1− τ)σ
(1− τ)lj + bL −
δ
m
[1 + (n− 1)β]
}[
ρ+ (1− Aσ)λ(L− lj) + ν P˙
P
]
. (22)
Because there is symmetry throughout countries j = 1, ..., n in the model,
noting (1), (2), (4) and (9), it is true that
lj = l, zj = z = L− l, cj = c, M = m = nl, pj = p = 1, wj = Aγj . (23)
6
Given (3), (8) and (23), the consumption good is produced according to
cj = c =
y
n
=
1
n
n∏
j=1
y
1/n
j =
1
n
Aγ
n∏
j=1
l
1/n
j =
l
n
Aγ, γ
.
=
1
n
n∑
j=1
γj, (24)
where γ the serial number of the consumption-good technology. Because the
improvement of productivity Aγj in the production of good j, (8), follows the
Poisson process (10), and because labor inputs lj are constant over time in
the stationary state, then, given (3), the improvement of productivity in the
production y of the consumption good follows the Poisson process q with
dq =
{
1 with probability λ(L− l)dt,
0 with probability 1− λ(L− l)dt. (25)
Thus, the expected growth rate of consumption y in the stationary state is
g
.
= E
[
log Aγ+1 − log Aγ] = (logA)λz = (logA)λ(L− l), (26)
where E is the expectation operator (cf., [1], p. 59, and [12]). Noting (23),
the budget constraint (12) changes into
b = τ
n∑
j=1
wjlj
/(
L
n∑
j=1
wj
)
=
τ l
L
. (27)
Finally, given (23), the accumulation of pollution (14) changes into
P˙ = nl − hP with ∂P˙ /∂l = n. (28)
I consider the stationary state where the union has attained its equilibrium
level of pollution. Given (28), the conditions for that state are
P˙ = 0, hP = M(l) = m = nl. (29)
Inserting (23), (27) and (29) into (22) and solving for l, one obtains the
equilibrium level of emissions in the stationary state:
l =
1/n+ (1− 1/n)β
(1− τ)σ − δ[1/n+ (1− 1/n)β]− 1
νh/λ
Aσ − 1
+
(1− τ)σ − δ[1/n+ (1− 1/n)β]
1− (1− τ)σ + δ[1/n+ (1− 1/n)β]
(
ρ/λ
Aσ − 1 − L
)
. (30)
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5 The central planner
Noting (2) and (24), the welfare in the union takes the form
U(c,m, T ) =
∫ ∞
T
Aσγn−σ−δlσ−δP−νe−ρ(t−T )dt, (31)
The central planner maximizes this welfare by labor in production, l, subject
to technological change (25) and the dynamics of pollution (28). Noting (24),
the value of the optimal program starting at time T for the central planner
is
Γ(γ, P, T ) = max
l s.t. (25),(14)
E
∫ ∞
T
Aσγn−σ−δlσ−δP−νe−ρ(t−T )dt. (32)
The Bellman equation corresponding to this optimal program is given by
ρΓ(γ, P, T )
= max
l
{
Aσγ
P ν
lσ−δ
nσ+δ
+
∂Γ
∂P
P˙ + λ(L− l)[Γ(γ + 1, P, T )− Γ(γ, P, T )]}. (33)
Noting (28), this maximization leads to the first-order condition:
∂{}
∂l
= (σ − δ)A
σγ
P ν
lσ−δ−1
nσ+δ
+ n
∂Γ
∂P
− λ[Γ(γ + 1, P, T )− Γ(γ, P, T )] = 0. (34)
Noting σ < 1, the second-order condition ∂2{}/∂l2 < 0 is equivalent to σ > δ.
To solve the dynamic program, I try the solution that the value of the
program, Γ, is in fixed proportion ϑ > 0 to instantaneous utility:
Γ(γ, T ) = ϑAσγn−σ−δlσ−δP−ν . (35)
This implies
Γ(γ + 1, T )/Γ(γ, T ) = Aσ > 1, ∂Γ/∂P = −νΓ/P < 0. (36)
From ∂Γ/∂P < 0 and the first-order condition (34) it follows that σ > δ.
I consider this equilibrium only in the stationary state where P˙ = 0 and
(29) hold true. Inserting (35) and (36) into the Bellman equation (33) yields
1/ϑ = ρ+ (1− Aσ)λ(L− l) > 0. (37)
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Inserting (29), (35), (36) and (37) into (34) and solving for l, one obtains the
Pareto-optimal level of emissions, l∗:
l∗ .=
(Aσ − 1)−1
(1− σ + δ)λ
{
(δ − σ)[ρ+ (1− Aσ)L]− hν}, ∂l∗
∂(hν)
< 0. (38)
This, l∗ > 0, σ > δ, σ < 1 and Aσ > 1 yield ρ+(1−Aσ)L < 0 and ∂l∗/∂δ < 0.
Noting this, (26) and (38), the Pareto-optimal growth is g∗ = (logA)(L− l∗),
for which ∂g∗/∂(hν) > 0 and ∂g∗/∂δ > 0. I summarize the result as follows:
Proposition 1 The Pareto-optimal growth rate g∗ is the higher, the more
emissions or pollution are disliked (i.e. the bigger δ or ν), or the higher the
absorbtion rate of pollution, h.
When emissions or pollution is disliked, labor is transferred from “dirty” pro-
duction to “clean” R&D, which boosts economic growth. A high absorbtion
rate eases the constraint for the central planner and boosts economic growth.
The central planner sets the tax parameter τ to establish the Pareto
optimum l = l∗. From ρ+(1−Aσ)λL < 0, (30) and (38) it then follows that
τ ∗ .=
1− β
σ
(
1− 1
n
)δ + (1− σ)hν/[ρ+ (1− Aσ)λL]
1− hν/[ρ+ (1− Aσ)λL] > 0,
∂τ ∗
∂(hν)
< 0,
∂τ ∗
∂δ
=
1− β
σ
(
1− 1
n
) 1
1− hν/[ρ+ (1− Aσ)λL] > 0. (39)
Thus, the following result is obtained:
Proposition 2 The optimal emission tax τ ∗ that leads to the Green Golden
Rule is given by (39). This increases with the number n of countries. When
the union is a single jurisdiction, n = 1, the tax is zero. The tax is the
lower, the greater is the other local planners’ anticipated response β. The
more emissions are disliked (i.e. the higher δ), the less pollution is disliked
(i.e. the smaller ν) or the smaller the absorbtion rate of pollution, h, the
higher the emission tax.
The more countries in the union (i.e. the bigger n), the higher proportion
of the emissions of a country falls outside the country and the less a local
planner is willing to reduce emissions. Consequently, a higher tax is needed to
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make a local planner to reduce its emissions. Noting (13) and the symmetry
lj/m ≈ 1/n, the elasticity of total emissions m with respect to emissions in
a single country lj is given by
lj
m
∂M
∂lj
= [1 + (n− 1)β] lj
m
≈ 1
n
+
(
1− 1
n
)
β.
With estimating this elasticity, one can estimate β. The more a local planner
expects the others to follow its policy (i.e. the bigger β), the less space it
has for raising its emissions and the smaller tax (39) is adequate for reducing
its emissions. Disliking emissions (i.e. a high δ) increases the benefit of
the emission tax, ∂τ ∗/∂δ > 0. Disliking pollution (i.e. a high ν) or high
absorbtion rate h strengthens the welfare effect of the tax. In that case, a
smaller tax τ ∗ is adequate for maintaining the Pareto optimum, ∂τ ∗/∂(hν) <
0.
6 Conclusions
This study examines optimal emission policy in a union of countries. The
results are expressed in the form of Pareto-optimal emission taxes. These
lead to the best sustainable configuration (e.g. the Green Golden Rule) in
the stationary state. The optimal emission tax can be determined once the
response parameter β is estimated. The other relevant information for the tax
contains the wages, the parameters of the utility function and the absorbtion
rate of pollution. The model can be extended in the following directions:
1. Countries can be of different size. A big country is a Stackelberg leader,
which takes the optimal responses of smaller countries into account.
2. There is technological diffusion so that investment in R&D in one coun-
try improves productivity also in the other countries.
3. There is capital that is accumulated by private saving. This forms a
differential equation that enters as an constraint in the optimization.
Emissions can be complementary to labor, capital or output.
4. Following [4], [9], [10] and [11], productivity can follow a Wiener pro-
cess, which means that it is a Poisson-Wiener process that is optimized.
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